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Since the early 1990s an unprecedented process of consolidation has taken place in
the banking sector in most industrialised countries raising concern of policymakers
that it may reduce access to credit for the small business sector. While most of
the existing empirical studies have focused on the U.S., this paper is the ﬁrst one
empirically investigating the eﬀects of banking consolidation in Germany. As small
and medium sized German companies traditionally almost exclusively rely on bank
credit and as they represent the vast majority of the corporate sector reduced credit
availability for those companies could particularly endanger economic growth.
Based on an exceptional panel dataset comprising merged data of the German
credit register and balance sheet data of German ﬁrms and banks we ﬁnd - con-
trary to public fear - that the ongoing banking consolidation in Germany does not
have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the ﬁnancing of small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SME). We measure the ﬁnancing opportunities of SMEs based on the bank
debt/assets ratio and the logarithmized credit size and control both explicitly for
bank mergers and for the increase in the average bank size in the course of the
consolidation process. In addition, we observe that the concentration in the banking
market is insigniﬁcant for SME ﬁnancing and that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between commercial banks, savings banks and private banks.
Keywords: Banking consolidation, bank mergers, SME ﬁnancing
JEL classiﬁcation: G1, G2, G21Non technical summary
Over the last years, the fear of a worsening credit access for middle-market ﬁrms
has been regularly evoked, particularly in Germany. The reasons were principally
two-fold: the introduction of Basel II and the ongoing banking consolidation. While
the Basel II conditions have meanwhile been tailored in a way that avoids disad-
vantages for SMEs, the potential adverse eﬀects of banking consolidation are still
subject to lively discussions in the public, notably as consolidation will be ongoing
in the upcoming years.
As theory does not provide for an unambiguous answer with regard to the po-
tential eﬀects of banking consolidation, it rests an empirical matter to assess the
total impact of banking consolidation on small business ﬁnance. However, empirical
studies have almost exclusively been carried out for the US; the current study is the
ﬁrst empirical study for Germany.
The outcome of this study points to the conclusion that banking consolidation in
Germany has not worsened SMEs’ access to bank credit. More speciﬁcally, neither
do bank mergers have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the volume of SME’s bank credit nor
does an increasing bank size in the context of banking consolidation negatively aﬀect
SME’s portion of ﬁnancing by bank debt. This outcome is based on a comprehensive
dataset, comprising merged data on banks, ﬁrms and the banking market. However,
smaller SMEs tend to be underrepresented in the dataset due to the fact that the
German credit register does only include credit exceeding the threshold of e1.5m.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahren wurde wiederholt über die mögliche Gefahr einer Ver-
schlechterung der Kreditbedingungen für den Mittelstand diskutiert. Als Gründe
wurden hierbei insbesondere die Einführung von Basel II sowie mögliche nega-
tive Auswirkungen der Bankenkonsolidierung genannt. Während den Bedenken im
Zusammenhang mit Basel II mittlerweile durch Regelungen Rechnung getragen
wurde, die eine Belastung des Mittelstandes vermeiden, ist letztere Diskussion nach
wie vor sehr aktuell, da mit einem weiteren Fortschreiten der Konsolidierung gerech-
net wird.
Die Theorie liefert keine eindeutige Prognose hinsichtlich der Auswirkungen der
Bankenkonsolidierung, und empirische Studien zu diesem Thema beziehen sich über-
wiegend auf die Vereinigten Staaten. In dieser Arbeit wird erstmalig der Zusammen-
hang zwischen den Finanzierungsbedingungen von Unternehmen und der Konsoli-
dierung im Bankensektor speziell für Deutschland untersucht.
Die vorliegende Studie legt den Schluss nahe, dass die Bankenkonsolidierung
bisher nicht mit negativen Auswirkungen auf die Mittelstandsﬁnanzierung einherge-
gangen ist. Sowohl der Zusammenhang zwischen Fusionen von Banken und der
Summe der Bankkredite von Unternehmen als auch der Zusammenhang zwischen
der (zunehmenden) Größe einer Bank und dem Anteil der Bankkreditﬁnanzierung
eines Unternehmens ist ökonomisch vernachlässigbar. Die Ergebnisse basieren auf
einem hochwertigen und umfangreichen Datensatz, in dem allerdings kleine Mittel-
ständler unterrepräsentiert sind, da Unternehmen erst ab einer Gesamtverschuldung
von mindestens 1,5 Mio. Euro berücksichtigt wurden.Contents
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- Empirical Evidence for Germany1
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, improvements in information technology, ﬁnancial dereg-
ulation and liberalisation2 have contributed to create a more competitive environ-
ment and have encouraged an unprecedented consolidation in the banking sector
within and across many industrial countries. In the U.S. and the Euro area, M&A
activity in the ﬁnancial institution sector has led to a drastic and continuous decline
in the number of banks and increased concentration. While the number of banks in
the U.S. already fell by more than one-third until the end of the 1990s, the number
of credit institutions in the Euro area has also declined substantially, from around
9,500 in 1995 to 6,400 in 2004.3
Consolidation in the banking industry has raised concerns among policymakers
that this may lead to a reduced availability of credit for small businesses, primarily
due to the decrease in the number of small banks specialised in this type of lend-
ing. Generally speaking, a decline in small business lending may be harmful for the
economy ﬁrstly because of the substantial contribution of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SME)4 to national output and job creation. In 2003, SMEs accounted
for around 70% of total employment and generated around 40% of all turnover in
Germany.5 A similar importance of SMEs can be perceived in many European coun-
tries. Secondly, with the exception of the United States, SMEs tend to rely more
on debt ﬁnancing than large ﬁrms. Given that within the Euro area, Germany, the
largest banking market in Europe, has experienced by far the largest reduction in
the number of banks6, and that German SMEs, also known in Germany as the ”Mit-
telstand”7, almost exclusively rely on bank credit, it becomes obvious to evaluate
1We particularly thank Beatrice Weder, Thilo Liebig, Frank Heid and Christoph Memmel for
stimulating comments and contributions to this study. Moreover, we would like to thank the partic-
ipants of the Workshop ”Forschung zu Finanzstabilität mit Hilfe von Bankdaten der Bundesbank”
held at the Deutsche Bundesbank December 5, 2005 and the participants of the GBAS workshop
held at the Goethe University Frankfurt March 20, 2006.
2The causes of consolidation have been well documented (e.g. Berger et al. (1999)).
3European Central Bank (2005), p.79.
4According to the deﬁnition of the European Commission for an enterprise to be classiﬁed as
an SME it must have no more than 249 employees, its turnover (annual balance sheet) must not
exceed e50 millions (e43 millions), and no more than 25 percent of the capital of the enterprise
must be controlled by one or more other enterprises.
5Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn (IfM Bonn). For stylized facts on SMEs in the euro
area and further details on SME ﬁnancing pattern and possible constraints see European Central
Bank (2007).
6From 1995 till 2004 the number of credit institutions declined from 3,785 to 2,148 (European
Central Bank (2005), p. 79), while the number of branches has remained fairly stable. Yet, Germany
still hosts most banks in Europe and remains the most fragmented banking market.
7In contrast to the term ”SME” which is commonly used in most countries, the German ”Mit-
telstand” is not only deﬁned by size patterns but also by characteristics like private ownership,
freedom in decision making and contracting, individual responsibility of entrepreneurs for success
of failure of the own enterprise (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung (2004), p. 1).
1the eﬀects of banking consolidation on small business ﬁnance in Germany.8 However,
while there is a growing empirical literature on banking consolidation, most of the
existing studies have focused on the U.S. banking market. This paper is the ﬁrst
one presenting empirical evidence on the impact of banking consolidation on small
business ﬁnance in Germany. We thereby also take up the fear that banking consol-
idation in Germany worsens small business ﬁnancing, which has been the subject of
a lively public discussions over the last years, for example in the context of Basel II.
Based on a panel data set comprising merged data of the German credit register
and balance sheet data of German ﬁrms and banks, we investigate the relationship
between the importance of bank ﬁnancing for small businesses and banking size. We
use the bank debt/asset ratio and the logarithmized credit size, respectively, as the
dependent variables and ﬁnd that the ongoing banking consolidation in Germany
has, if at all, only a very small negative impact on the ﬁnancing structure of SMEs
by controlling both explicitly for bank mergers and for the increase of the average
bank size in the course of the consolidation process. Moreover, we do not ﬁnd that
concentration aﬀects SME ﬁnancing and there are no diﬀerences between the three
German banking pillars. These results have been found to be robust under various
model settings.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature overview on
the theory and empirical evidence of banking consolidation and SME ﬁnancing. In
section 3, we set up hypotheses based on our methodological procedure. Section 4
gives an overview on the data and variables. Section 5 presents the regression results
and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Theory
While it has been shown that banking consolidation has many beneﬁts, including
increased eﬃciency9 and better diversiﬁcation that also supports macroeconomic
stability10, concern had been raised that it may adversely aﬀect the availability of
credit to small ﬁrms. Consolidation in most countries has involved a large number
of small banks traditionally specialised in providing credit to small businesses. It is
feared that the larger and more complex banks emerging from consolidation will be
less likely to lend to these companies. The main argument for this reasoning is the
observation that larger banks typically have a smaller propensity to lend to small
ﬁrms, i.e. small business lending generally makes up a smaller share of larger banks’
total loans. Using this as a starting point, one might expect that smaller banks
initially constrained in lending to small ﬁrms may, once reorganized into larger
banks, shift their portfolios of loans in favor of larger borrowers or even shift their
asset composition away from traditional lending activities. Furthermore, as smaller
8For recent data on the ﬁnancial structure of German SMEs see Deutscher Sparkassen und
Giroverband (DSGV) (2006).
9For a review of the existing literature see Amel et al. (2004). For Germany, Koetter (2005)
found relatively limited advantages of mergers with respect to eﬃciency gains.
10See Walkner and Raes (2005), p.7.
2ﬁrms are more opaque in terms of information than larger ones and as small banks
enjoy comparative advantages in overcoming information asymmetries, a decrease
in small business credit may also be observed because these loans are less proﬁtable
for larger banking organizations.
However, as banking industry consolidation is a dynamic process, it can be ex-
pected that market participants will adapt their strategies. The likely eﬀect on small
business lending cannot be simply inferred from this static comparison of the ac-
tual lending behavior of small and large banks. Further dynamic eﬀects of changes
in eﬃciency, competition and the organizational structure have to be considered
which potentially outweigh the negative eﬀects. In a competitive market, eﬃciency
gains through cost savings due to technological advances (e.g. use of credit scoring
and credit factories) or better risk diversiﬁcation are likely to be passed through to
borrowers who may beneﬁt from more favorable loan conditions. Following Baumol
(1982) the potential new entries will restrain the competitors from exploiting their
market power. These new competitors may enter the market and pick up any small
business loan dropped by merged institutions and so in equilibrium there would
be no changes in small business lending. Another argument in this direction is put
forward by Demsetz (1973). Taking concentration as endogenous, he argues that
more eﬃcient banks will charge lower prices and gain higher market shares, lead-
ing to higher prices in markets with big diﬀerences in eﬃciencies than in markets
with similar eﬃciencies. By contrast, loan conditions may deteriorate if banks are
able to exploit their market power.11 However, competition might also increase small
business lending because it forces banks to search for additional proﬁt opportunities.
As the theoretical literature can only identify possible positive and negative
eﬀects of banking consolidation, it rests an empirical matter to assess the total
impact of banking consolidation on small business ﬁnance and to try to disentangle
the afore mentioned eﬀects.
2.2 Empirical evidence
While there has been extensive empirical work on the impact of banking consolida-
tion on small business ﬁnance in the U.S., only a few papers focused on the European
banking market and none of them deals with Germany.
In the empirical literature three main approaches have been followed. A ﬁrst
group of studies investigates the relationship between bank size and access to small
business ﬁnance, inspired by the above mentioned fact that large banks devote less
of their loan granting to SMEs.12 Strahan and Weston (1998) ﬁnd that M&A be-
tween smaller banks lead to an increase in small business lending, whereas mergers
between larger banks tend to negatively inﬂuence small business lending. These
studies for the US-market focus, due to data restrictions on the bank side, mainly
on the lending process of a bank. Craig and Hardee (2004) in contrast focus on the
eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing structure. The results of their study suggest that in a
market with higher market shares of large banks, small ﬁrms will receive less credit.
11Hannan (1991a) and Hannan (1991b).
12See, for example, Peek and Rosengren (1996),Strahan and Weston (1996).
3However, Peek and Rosengren (1998) emphasize that besides the bank size the pre-
merger specialization of the bank is also important for the post-merger behavior.
The empirical outcome is that acquiring banks with a high portion of SME lending
before the merger tend to try to oﬀset the negative eﬀect induced by the merger. For
France Dietsch (2003) argues that consolidation made credit more easily accessible
to SMEs.
A second strain of studies evaluates the eﬀects of M&A in the banking sector
by investigating the loan granting policy of the banks being involved and the de-
terminants of their borrower relationships. The major questions analyzed in this
context are: Do borrowers from a merging bank have a higher probability of being
suspended from credit? Do the conditions/credit prices of the loans change after
a merger? Are there direct eﬀects on the other lenders in the concerned market?
In a study on the Italian market, Sapienza (2002) focuses on credit prices and the
probability that banks stop cultivating relationship banking in the aftermath of a
merger. According to this study, mergers aﬀecting a substantial market share lead
to an increase in interest rates and small ﬁrms have an overall higher probability
of loosing their lending relationship after a bank merger than larger ﬁrms. Using a
very similar database, other authors study the eﬀects of mergers on the quantity
and quality of credit. The studies reveal that mergers tend to temporarily decrease
volume and quality while acquisitions have an opposite eﬀect.13 For the US-market
Berger et al. (1998) ﬁnd a negative impact of consolidation on SME ﬁnancing but
point out that much of this eﬀect would be oﬀset either by direct eﬀects (internal re-
structuring after acquisitions) or by external eﬀects (changes of the lending behavior
of competitors in the same market).
A third group of studies focuses on the impact of increased banking market
concentration on the access to and conditions of SME bank ﬁnance. In a study on
the US banking market Avery and Samolyk (2000) found that consolidation in rural
markets negatively aﬀect loan growth as well as consolidation in concentrated urban
markets. However, they conﬁrm previous empirical ﬁndings that mergers between
small banks tend to increase small business lending. Another study by Beck et al.
(2003) focusing on a sample of 74 countries, including both developed and non-
developed ones, revealed that higher market concentration worsens SMEs’ access to
credit, but this eﬀect is found to be less pronounced for developed countries.
DeYoung et al. (1999) directly address the market entrance of banks. They ﬁnd
that young or newly founded banks have a higher propensity to lend to small busi-
nesses than older banks do. Hence, they argue that a continuous stream of de novo
banks could help to overcome the negative eﬀects of consolidation. When market
entry would be free, new banks would emerge and pick up the dropped borrowers
from (merged) banks.
Although the results of these empirical studies suggest that the feared negative
consequences of banking consolidation on small business credit have generally been
over-estimated, they also show that the speciﬁc results very much depend on the
characteristics of the relevant banking market and the set-up of the empirical study.
Other studies’ ﬁndings may therefore not hold true for the German market, in par-
ticular as the German banking market is unique with its three pillar system, the
13Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001).
4traditionally important role of relationship lending and the remaining high degree
of fragmentation.14 This study seeks to overcome this gap by providing ﬁrst evidence
on the impact of banking consolidation on German SME ﬁnancing.
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Hypothesis
In general, consolidation in the banking market leads to a lower number of larger
banks competing in the same market, i.e. banking consolidation produces larger
banks and a higher concentration in the banking market. As discussed before this
might negatively aﬀect credit availability for SMEs because the lending policy of
banks changes. Accordingly, we seek to analyze how consolidation in the banking
sector aﬀects the ﬁnancing structure of ﬁrms, especially SMEs. We rely on two diﬀer-
ent approaches, a direct and an indirect approach, in order to make comprehensive
use of the information contained in the data set and to thereby more thoroughly
test for the robustness of the results. The advantages and potential shortcomings of
each approach will be discussed below.
First, we seek to directly investigate the behavior of banks involved in M&A
activities (merger eﬀect). As described before, a popular belief is that banks might
reduce their lending to SMEs after a merger, e.g. through cutting credit relationships.
We therefore test the following hypothesis15:
Hypothesis 1: If a bank is involved in M&A activities, its SME credit ﬁnancing
worsens.
More precisely the question we seek to answer in this context is: Does the total
amount of bank credit of a ﬁrm change after one of their lending banks has merged
with or is acquired by another bank? In case that the total amount of bank credit of
a ﬁrm does not substantially change after the consolidation, we assume that there is
either no negative eﬀect or competition in the banking market seems highly intensive
to overcome potential negative eﬀects, e.g. as other banks extend existing loans or
pick up borrowers whose loan contracts had been terminated.
Second, we investigate the indirect consolidation eﬀect of an increasing size of
banks on the ﬁnancing structure of ﬁrms (size eﬀect). Based on the fact that large
banks devote smaller parts of their portfolio to small business loans, we examine a
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The size of banking institutions negatively aﬀects the ﬁnancing
conditions of SMEs, i.e. reducing the availability of bank credit for the latter.
Our research question is: When controlling for ﬁrm and market characteristics,
does the size of the lending bank still matter for the ﬁnancing structure of a ﬁrm
14For a detailed description on the German banking market see Krahnen and Schmidt (2004)
and IMF (2004).
15Other interesting eﬀects of banking consolidation in Germany that are not covered by this study
are eﬃciency gains or losses for banks (see e.g. Koetter (2005)) and the emergence of alternative
ﬁnancing opportunities, for example.
5(the portion of bank debt)? This approach does not directly assess the eﬀects of
consolidation, but should lead to a ﬁrst assessment whether an increasing bank size
should implicitly raise concern with regard to small business ﬁnance or not.
Besides these two eﬀects, we also investigate whether concentration in the lender
market inﬂuences the ﬁnancing structure of SMEs. Assuming that the relatively low
margin level in Germany reﬂects the limited ability of banks in demanding risk-
adjusted premia16, we would expect that concentration has no eﬀect or rather a
negative one. Moreover, given the speciﬁc structure of the German banking market,
we try to assess if diﬀerences exist in the lending policy across the three pillars17
resulting from banking consolidation.
In line with DeYoung et al. (1999), we recognize that both the size eﬀect and the
eﬀect of increasing concentration may be counteracted by the entrance of new banks
into the market. However, given that these new entrants will neither instantaneously
allocate a substantial market share nor contribute to a signiﬁcant drop in bank size,
we assume that this fact is not among the major drivers of our results. Furthermore,
given that the German banking market tends to be overbanked, market entrance is
rather unlikely, at least in most regions.
3.2 Methodology
We use two panel data sets for our analysis. The initial data set is based on informa-
tion about lending relationships between banks and ﬁrms, each observation linking
one ﬁrm to one single lender. We refer to this panel as the lending relationship level.
The second data set allows us to get an even deeper insight into the eﬀects on the
ﬁrm level by aggregating over the ﬁrm dimension. In the following, we will refer to
this second data set as the ﬁrm level data set. While this allows us to take into ac-
count that one ﬁrm might have more than one lending relationship, this aggregation
procedure leaves us with some additional problems regarding the incorporation of
information on the lender(s) that will be discussed in section 4.
The merger eﬀect, i.e. to determine whether the total amount of credit changes
in the course of banking consolidation, is tested by means of the ﬁrm level panel.
We capture the determinants of the credit demand of ﬁrms by a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables and control for the concentration in the regional market. Using a ﬁxed-
eﬀects panel approach with subscripts i for ﬁrm, m for regions and t for years,18
we use the following regression model similar to e.g. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi
(2003) and Dietsch (2003):
Yit = αi + β1Merger_dummiesit + β2HHImt + β3Ait + β4Dt + it (1)
The dependent variable, Yit, is deﬁned as the logarithm of the total amount
of credit per ﬁrm and year. The main focus in this model lies on a set of dummy
variables (Merger_dummiesit) to control for the potential eﬀects of M&A activities
on the amount of credit. We use three diﬀerent merger dummies: The ﬁrst one takes
16See Paul et al. (2004), for example.
17The three pillars are private/commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks.
18The dataset provides annual data and each ﬁrm is located in one regional market.
6the value one if at least one of the lending banks of the ﬁrm has merged within the
current year19, the second dummy controls for mergers in the preceding year and the
third dummy for mergers two years before. The economic reasoning behind the use
of lagged merger-dummies is as follows: the eﬀects of the changed internal structure
of the bank may not directly aﬀect the amount of credit, contracts are usually signed
for longer horizons and a modiﬁed lending policy may take several years to be fully
implemented.20
Furthermore, we control for changes in the local banking market structure by
introducing the Hirschmann-Herﬁndahl-Index on a regional basis (HHImt) as an
explanatory variable. A vector of ﬁrm characteristics, Ait, (including the legal form,
the industry sector aﬃliation, the default probability, the equity ratio, the turnover
to assets ratio and the number of lenders per ﬁrm) and a vector of year dummies
(Dt) complete our list of control variables. Finally, it represents the individual error
term.
Turning to our second hypothesis, we analyze the size eﬀect by referring to the
ratio bank debt to assets for each ﬁrm i at time t as the dependent variable similar
to Craig and Hardee (2004). We choose this variable as we expect that the ﬁnancing
structure of a ﬁrm (namely the amount of bank ﬁnancing) varies with the size of
the lending bank (all else being equal).21 Our analysis is twofold: ﬁrst we use the
lending relationship panel, which can be seen as a natural experiment in our case
and second we run the same regression for the ﬁrm level panel.
Based on the lending relationship level, we are able to test our hypothesis while
holding all ﬁrm variables constant, i.e. we determine our results based on con-
stant ﬁrm parameters but changing bank characteristics. The main advantage of
this analysis is that we use the full information set on lenders. The ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression model takes the following form:
Yit = αi + β1BankSizejt + β2HHImt + β3Ait + β4Bjt + β5Dt + it (2)
The size of a bank (BankSizejt) is measured by the total assets (in bn e). To
control for potential bank-speciﬁc eﬀects we include a vector Bjt with dummies for
savings banks, cooperative banks and commercial banks, other ﬁnancial institutions
being the omitted category. The remaining explanatory variables are identical to the
ﬁrst regression model, namely a vector of the ﬁrm characteristics Ait (whereas we
drop the number of lenders for the relationship level data set) and a concentration
measure, the HHI as well as the individual error terms.
The potential shortcoming of this speciﬁcation is that it disregards information
about the weight of each credit for each borrower: A lending relationship only rep-
resenting a small share of a ﬁrms’ total credit has the same weight as a lending
relationship being the only one for a ﬁrm. Therefore, we test the size eﬀect in a
19More speciﬁcally, the dummy takes the value 1 at time t if a merger took place between July,
1 of year t-1 and June, 31 of year t.
20In the empirical literature, a diﬀerentiated time pattern for the adjustments after a merger has
been found, for example, by Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2003) and Degryse et al. (2004).
21However, we acknowledge that an increasing bank size may also result simply from cross-
sectional diﬀerences or inter-temporal changes in our dataset and due to natural growth in the
banking sector, for example.
7next step with the ﬁrm level panel. We replace the measure of a banks’ size by the
indebtedness-weighted average bank size (see section 4 for further explanations),
using this as a proxy for the representative lender of the ﬁrm. We furthermore drop
the dummies controlling for the pillars.
The advantage of this latter speciﬁcation (a straightforward panel speciﬁcation)
comes along with the disadvantage that information about the lender is lost. In sum,
we expect that by using both panels we are able to exploit the advantages of both
speciﬁcations and ultimately verify the robustness of our results.
As our focus lies on small and medium-sized enterprises and as we would expect
to ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects for small and large ﬁrms, respectively, we split our sample into
two subsamples, ”SMEs” and ”Large ﬁrms”, and run the regressions accordingly.22
4 Data set description
We start out our empirical analysis with an exceptional dataset comprising merged
and edited data of the German credit register, balance sheet data of German ﬁrms
and balance sheet data of German banks.23 The data set thus includes data from
proﬁt and loss accounts as well as from the balance sheets of the ﬁrms. Informa-
tion about the lenders is taken from proﬁt and loss accounts, balance sheets and
audit reports. The credit register gives information about the amount of credit per
relationship. We use the period from 1996 to 2002 as the coverage of all underlying
datasets is best for this period. The high quality of the merge of the datasets has
been ensured by means of diﬀerent robustness checks.24
Crucial factors that determine ﬁrms’ access to credit are their creditworthiness
and proﬁtability, respectively, the reason being that ﬁrms with sub-investment grade
ratings are more likely to have borrowing diﬃculties. Accordingly, we calculate sev-
eral ﬁrm ratios (turnover to assets, equity to assets, bank debt to assets) and a
logit-model based default probability of ﬁrms.25 On the basis of the credit register
we count the number of lending relationships per ﬁrm (number of lenders), being
perceived as a proxy for the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing opportunities in terms of a more exten-
sive bargaining power.
As credit demand and credit supply also depend on the general economic environ-
ment, which can vary from year to year, we include year dummies and a measure of
the concentration in the regional banking market. For the latter purpose we identify
67 regions to which each ﬁrm is assigned and calculate the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl-
Index from the credit register data.26
22The tables in the text show the results for the full sample and the two subsamples, whereas
the tables for the robustness checks in the appendix show the SME subsample results.
23Further information about the merged dataset can be found in Schmieder (2006).
24For this purpose, we consider only observations with a reasonable coverage ratio (the ratio of
total credit debt as reported in the credit register to the bank debt taken from the balance sheet
of the ﬁrms) and ﬁrms reporting more than e1.5 millions bank debt in their balance sheet, as this
is the threshold for the credit register.
25See Krüger et al. (2005). The default probability is calculated based on a logistic regression
rating model in a cross-sectional context with more than 200 defaults.
26Assuming that the relevant market for each ﬁrm is its regional one, this is done as follows:
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As mentioned above, we also use a data set aggregated on the ﬁrm level. The
aggregation procedure leaves us with the challenge of how to treat information on the
potential numerous lenders of each ﬁrm. In order to be still able to analyze the size
eﬀect, we calculate an average for the lending banks. While we have information on
the individual loan size, we use this as weights to control for the importance lenders
have for the speciﬁc borrower.27
The lending relationship level panel dataset comprises a total of 85,678 observa-
tions from the period of 1996 to 2002 corresponding to 6,165 ﬁrms (cf. Table 1).28
The ﬁrm level panel exhibits 25,073 observations29, i.e. each ﬁrm has on average
3.4 lending relationships per year.30 The distribution of the number of observations
for the two panels over time is shown below. SMEs make up around 75% of the
observations on the ﬁrm level.
Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrms in our sample can be found in Table 5 and
Table 6 in the Appendix. We show summary statistics for the full sample and for
both subsamples on the basis of the ﬁrm level and on the relationship level data
set for the variables used in the regression. The main diﬀerences between SMEs and
large ﬁrms can be observed in both panels: SMEs ﬁnance themselves more by bank
debt and less by equity than large ﬁrms. Their default probability is only slightly
higher and the ratio of turnover to assets is smaller. There is also a clear diﬀerence
between SMEs and larger ﬁrms in terms of the number of lending relationships:
We use the amount of total credit granted in one region and calculate the portion each individual
bank grant, square this and sum it up for each year and each region. The HHI varies from 0.008
to 0.37.
27This calculation requires some caveats. First, we thereby assume that the ﬁrms’ overall in-
debtedness is contained in the dataset, which may, given the nominal credit exposure threshold of
Ă1.5m in the German credit register, not be fulﬁlled for some of the smaller ﬁrms. Second, given
the speciﬁc purpose and structure of the German credit register, the aggregation of the indebted-
ness may be related to double-counting, as the database is designed to mainly reﬂect the complex
interrelationship between ﬁrms on the disaggregated level.
28Depending on the variable speciﬁcation used for the regression, the sample size may decrease
considerably due to missing values and excluded outliers for both panels.
29The aggregation can be clariﬁed based on a straightforward example. Let us assume that
ﬁrm 1 borrows 300 euros from the bank A, 200 euros from bank B and 500 euros from bank C.
Accordingly, the lender dimension will be reduced as follows: ﬁrm 1 borrows 1000 euros from 3
banks and the bank with the largest exposure has a loan share of 0.5.
30Calculated as 85,678/25,073.
9while a median SME has a relationship with two banks, a median larger ﬁrm exhibits
ﬁve. Furthermore, the fact that more than 25% of the SMEs have only one lending
relationship clearly outlines the importance of housebanks in Germany
Based on the ﬁrm level data set SMEs have on average (median) 44.6% of their
assets ﬁnanced by bank debt and only 13.4% by equity (compared to 27.5% bank
debt and 20% equity for large ﬁrms). A median SME has e10m of assets and a
turnover of e15.4m, the median indebtedness is e3.8m and the corresponding values
for a median large ﬁrm are e54.2m of assets, a turnover of e94.6m and a total
indebtedness of e16.4m.31
For the lending relationship data set, the descriptive statistics are similar. For
the number of lenders, however, the numbers are higher than for the ﬁrm level data
as the lending relationships are counted more than once in this data set. For the
same reason, also the total assets and the turnover become higher, while the other
ratios remain relatively similar.
The decision of a bank to grant credit is driven on the one hand by the ﬁrm
characteristics, but on the other hand also the banks’ characteristics may play an
important role. Table 7 in the Appendix shows the size distribution of the banks.
The median of the total assets of banks in our sample is e0.68bn. The correspond-
ing median for the commercial banks is e0.75bn, e1.18bn for the savings banks
(excluding the Landesbanks) and e0.35bn for the cooperative banks (excluding the
central cooperative institutions).
It is often argued in this context that savings banks and cooperative banks have
a diﬀerent lending policy than private banks, which is accounted for in our studies by
means of bank pillar dummies for the relationship level panel. The average portion
of credit granted to ﬁrms is 44% for the commercial banks, 34% for the Landesbanks
and savings banks, 13% for the cooperative banks including their central institutions
and 9% for other banks.32 This outcome shows that our dataset seems to be less
representative for cooperative banks, as the portion for the cooperative bank sector
is substantially lower than it would be expected in practice, what will be taken into
account when it comes to the interpretation of our panel estimates.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Results
Table 2 shows the results of our ﬁrst regression investigating whether there is a
direct eﬀect of M&A activities on the credit exposure of ﬁrms (Merger-Eﬀect). For
the aforementioned reasons, we would expect to ﬁnd a negative eﬀect, while the
time-structure of the eﬀect is not clear a priori. In our SME sub-sample we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant negative direct eﬀect (Merge-Dummy), while the eﬀect one year after
the merger (Merge-Dummy (t-1)) is insigniﬁcant and turns out to be positive and
31Besides, we include the ﬁrms’ industry sector and legal form as control variables.
32Or, focussing on the number of observations, 46% of the credits are from commercial banks,
30% from savings banks and the Landesbanks and 12% from cooperative banks and their central
institutions.
10signiﬁcant two years later (Merge-Dummy (t-2)). However, given that the dependent
variable is measured in logarithms, so that the eﬀect expressed in percentage changes
of the total amount of credit is quite decent, -1.5% for the mergers in the same
year and +1.3% for mergers two years before. For the full sample, we observe that
only the positive eﬀect two years after the merger remains signiﬁcant, whereas all
other eﬀects turn to be insigniﬁcant. This may be explained by the fact that for our
second sub-sample of large ﬁrms, only the direct eﬀect is signiﬁcant (though positive
in contrast to our ﬁndings for the SMEs) and all other eﬀects are insigniﬁcant.
Table 2: Merger-Eﬀect Regression results
Dependent variable: logarithmized total indebtedness
Full sample SME Large ﬁrms
Merge-Dummy 0.009735 -0.014765** 0.032659**
(-1.61) (-2.29) (-2.41)
Merge-Dummy (t-1) 0.007523 -0.005818 0.008998
(-1.19) (-0.86) (-0.64)
Merge-Dummy (t-2) 0.017624*** 0.012783* 0.011488
(-2.81) (-1.88) (-0.82)
Concentration (HHI) -0.017342 -0.092973 0.063019
(-0.22) (-1.13) (-0.35)
Default probability 3.229589*** 2.344752*** 11.558767***
(-5.45) (-4.22) (-4.91)
Equity/Assets -0.830281*** -0.696132*** -1.176845***
(-22.68) (-19) (-11.91)
Turnover/Assets -0.127513*** -0.151456*** -0.133107***
(-20.83) (-21.65) (-9.42)
Number of lenders per ﬁrm 0.129493*** 0.192835*** 0.087712***
(-63.63) (-62.72) (-27.89)
Constant 8.579309*** 8.222893*** 9.642820***
(-469.96) (-445.06) (-165.96)
Observations 23,831 17,971 5,860
Number of ﬁrms 6,165 4,975 1,598
R-squared 0.29 0.34 0.27
within R-squared 0.294 0.342 0.269
between R-squared 0.49 0.539 0.551
overall R-squared 0.502 0.542 0.546
Notes: Year-, Legal form- and Industry-Dummies included. Absolute value of t-statistics
in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The outcome of an initially negative but relatively small eﬀect of banking consol-
idation on SME ﬁnancing that turns out to be counteracted afterwards is supported
by the results for the Size-Eﬀect (cf. Table 3 for the relationship level results and
Table 4 for the ﬁrm level results). On the relationship level, the banks’ size has a
signiﬁcant and negative, but limited eﬀect on the ratio of bank debt to assets for
both the SMEs and the total sample, while the eﬀect for large ﬁrms is also negative
but only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. On the ﬁrm level, the bank size has a highly
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on SMEs. However, this eﬀect is again very small. As the
banks’ size is measured in billion Euros and the dependent variable is a ratio, the ra-
tio of bank debt to assets of a SME would decrease by 0.034 percentage points given
an increase of the banks total assets by 1 trillion. Supposing that two median-sized
banks would merge, their size would increase by 0.677bn Euros, so that this merger
11would aﬀect the borrower by reducing their bank debt to assets ratio by 0.000023
percentage points. This eﬀect can be considered to be very small and negligible.
Table 3: Size-Eﬀect Regression results, Relationship level
Dependent variable: Bank debt/Firm’s assets
Full sample SME Large ﬁrms
Bank size (assets in bn e) -0.000005*** -0.000006** -0.000004*
(-2.87) (-2.15) (-1.9)
Commercial Banks -0.000119 0.000554 -0.000517
(-0.13) (-0.38) (-0.45)
Landesbanks 0.000727 0.001396 0.000448
(-0.66) (-0.8) (-0.34)
Savings Banks -0.002026** -0.001308 -0.002477*
(-1.98) (-0.86) (-1.87)
Cooperative banks Head Institutions 0.000779 0.000444 0.001105
(-0.48) (-0.18) (-0.57)
Cooperative banks -0.001627 -0.001439 -0.001264
(-1.27) (-0.79) (-0.73)
Concentration (HHI) -0.045156*** -0.014735 -0.096856***
(-4.47) (-0.99) (-7.13)
Default probability 2.752197*** 2.411672*** 4.398331***
(-35.47) (-25.44) (-27.62)
Equity/Assets -0.354519*** -0.320741*** -0.398890***
(-73.08) (-48.73) (-54.29)
Turnover/Assets -0.016963*** -0.017143*** -0.016318***
(-20.61) (-12.89) (-14.28)
Constant 0.486385*** 0.521869*** 0.427557***
(-145.61) (-109.94) (-79.33)
Observations 74,683 42,388 32,295
Number of ﬁrms 6,137 4,949 1,598
R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.17
within R-squared 0.13 0.114 0.165
between R-squared 0.226 0.211 0.102
overall R-squared 0.216 0.198 0.159
Notes: Year-, Legal form- and Industry- Dummies included. Omitted category for bank pillar
aﬃliation of lender: other ﬁnancial institutions. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The coeﬃcient of our measure for the concentration in the lenders’ market is
insigniﬁcant in most of the speciﬁcations. Only for the regression on the relation-
ship level for the full sample and the large ﬁrm sub-sample the eﬀect turns to be
negative and signiﬁcant, but this result may be driven by some large ﬁrms being
overrepresented in this sample (because of a high number of lending relationships).
The other ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables show the same results for all three spec-
iﬁcations and are in line with our expectations: Both the ﬁrms’ equity ratio and the
ratio of turnover to assets are signiﬁcant and negative, while the default probability
and the number of lenders exhibit a positive sign and are again highly signiﬁcant.
The pillar dummies are not signiﬁcant for the SME sub-sample, i.e. there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the pillars as regards their SME ﬁnancing policy
according to our deﬁnition. However, given that the database has been shown to
be misbalanced in terms of the portion of lending relationships (particularly for the
12Table 4: Size-Eﬀect Regression results, Firm-level
Dependent variable: Bank debt/Firm’s assets
Full Sample SME Large ﬁrms
Average bank size (assets in bn e) -0.000033*** -0.000034*** -0.000028
(-3.68) (-3.18) (-1.61)
Concentration (HHI) -0.007034 0.000134 -0.036747
(-0.36) (-0.01) (-1.07)
Default probability 2.404830*** 2.044871*** 5.465522***
(-16) (-12.47) (-11.93)
Equity/Assets -0.303729*** -0.293863*** -0.315792***
(-32.91) (-27.33) (-16.62)
Number of lenders per ﬁrm 0.010370*** 0.015560*** 0.007366***
(-20.46) (-17.57) (-12.23)
Turnover/Assets -0.014354*** -0.013501*** -0.012747***
(-9.23) (-6.53) (-4.64)
Constant 0.450609*** 0.478126*** 0.326499***
(-96.85) (-87.64) (-28.75)
Observations 23,831 17,971 5,860
Number of ﬁrms 6,165 4,975 1,598
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.18
within R-squared 0.129 0.119 0.179
between R-squared 0.112 0.145 0.104
overall R-squared 0.118 0.149 0.137
Notes: Year-, Legal form- and Industry-Dummies included. Absolute value of t-statistics
in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
cooperative banks), this result has to be interpreted with caution. For the large
ﬁrms, the outcome is analogous, with the exception of the savings banks, which
exhibit a signiﬁcant and negative sign indicating that large ﬁrms borrowing from
savings banks tend to have less bank debt.
5.2 Robustness of the results
In order to ensure the robustness of our estimates, we run a series of additional
regressions for all three speciﬁcations as shown in Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10 in
the Appendix, with a sole focus on the SME cases.
For the merger-eﬀect panel (Table 8), we vary both the ﬁrm side and the bank
side. As clearly shown, the merger eﬀects remain stable and the signs of the addi-
tional ﬁrm variables added are in line with our expectations. The only exception is
the case where the ﬁrm side variables are removed ”Firm-variation”), as the merge
dummy for the ﬁrst year becomes positive in that case. However, at the same time
the predictive power of the regression decreases substantially, indicating that essen-
tial information on the ﬁrm side is lost and is being somehow captured in the merge
dummy.
The same result occurs for the size-eﬀect panel, both on the relationship level
(Table 9) and on the ﬁrm-level (Table 10): For all four speciﬁcations in both cases,
the size eﬀect remains signiﬁcant, negative, but very limited. Similarly, the signs for
the control variables remain stable, with the exception of the POLS regression for
13the relationship level panel, where there is a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect for com-
mercial banks, the savings banks and the cooperative banks. However, this outcome
has to be interpreted in a very cautious way: ﬁrst, the relationship level speciﬁcation
assigns excess weight to larger banks with a higher number of lending relationships
in the panel data and second, the panel is relatively unbalanced in terms of its
distribution across the bank pillars. Another diﬀerence to the ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁca-
tions is that the POLS regression indicates a positive eﬀect of concentration in the
lenders’ market, which would point out that banking consolidation in terms of a
reduction of the concentration has a negative eﬀect on SME ﬁnancing. Again, the
eﬀect remains very limited, though. The results of the OLS regression indicate that
further research is necessary at a later point in time to track whether the banking
consolidation tends to remain rather insigniﬁcant on SME ﬁnancing in Germany.
6 Conclusion
Recently, there has been a lively debate on a worsening of SME ﬁnancing triggered by
various developments, notably a tendency to risk-adjusted pricing, a standardization
of credit origination and last but not least by banking consolidation. The debate was
particularly addressed in Germany, but also in many other countries that have been
enforced by similar developments.
The aim of this study was to trace these worries and to analyze the eﬀect of
banking consolidation in Germany on SME ﬁnancing. The focus of the analysis was
two-fold: First, we explicitly controlled for the eﬀect of bank mergers on the total
indebtedness of ﬁrms (and SMEs). Second, we also tested the eﬀect of an increase
in the lenders’ size and market concentration in the course of banking consolidation
on the ﬁrms’ bank debt/asset ratio.
Our results suggest that the ongoing banking consolidation in Germany does
principally not have a strong negative impact on the SME ﬁnancing, particularly
when directly controlling for mergers. Similarly, when controlling for the bank debt/
asset ratio, there is a very limited, almost negligible tendency to observe a reduced
SME ﬁnancing. Moreover, we do not ﬁnd that bank market concentration aﬀects
SME ﬁnancing.
We acknowledge, however, that the current concentration in the German banking
market is still among the lowest in the European Union and the market among the
most fragmented ones. This observation points out that the outcome of a similar
study at a later stage may reveal diﬀerent results. Moreover, the results require
some caveat. First, the analysis does not control for credit rationing, as the sample
does only include ﬁrms that obtained credit. Second, very small ﬁrms (with assets
below e5m) tend to be underrepresented in the dataset or those included may not
be representative.
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Table 5: Summary statistics for ﬁrms, Firm-level panel
25th percentile Median 75th percentile N
Full Sample
Bank debt/Assets 0.265 0.4073 0.5526 24,863
Equity/Assets 0.0674 0.1504 0.2662 24,863
Assets (in 1,000 e) 6,921 13,961 34,711 25,073
Turnover (in 1,000 e) 10,011 21,336 47,074 25,073
Total Indebtedness (in 1,000 e) 2,622 5,113 12,255 25,073
Default probability 0.0016 0.0031 0.0054 24,399
Turnover/Assets 0.9501 1.6654 2.4062 25,073
Number of lenders 1 2 4 25,073
Small and medium-sized enterprises
Bank debt/Assets 0.3116 0.446 0.5814 18,984
Equity/Assets 0.0573 0.134 0.2481 18,984
Assets (in 1,000 e) 5,847 9,976 18,543 19,185
Turnover (in 1,000 e) 7,778 15,380 26,353 19,185
Total Indebtedness (in 1,000 e) 2,279 3,835 7,533 19,185
Default probability 0.0018 0.0033 0.0058 18,523
Turnover/Assets 0.8402 1.6008 2.3206 19,185
Number of lenders 1 2 3 19,185
Large ﬁrms
Bank debt/Assets 0.1558 0.2747 0.4086 5,879
Equity/Assets 0.1171 0.2004 0.3061 5,879
Assets (in 1,000 e) 32,157 54,155 123,075 5,888
Turnover (in 1,000 e) 66,113 94,554 169,653 5,888
Total Indebtedness (in 1,000 e) 8,692 16,357 35,897 5,888
Default probability 0.0013 0.0024 0.0041 5,876
Turnover/Assets 1.268 1.8599 2.7569 5,888
Number of lenders 3 5 7 5,888
Notes: Changing numbers of observations are due to missing values for some variables
17Table 6: Summary statistics for ﬁrms, relationship level panel
25th percentile Median 75th percentile N
Full Sample
Bank debt/Assets 0.2368 0.3786 0.5269 85,678
Equity/Assets 0.0944 0.1839 0.2989 85,678
Assets (in 1,000 e) 13,251 34,990 133,789 85,678
Turnover (in 1,000 e) 14,645 37,248 103,764 85,678
Total Indebtedness (in 1,000 e) 1,343 2,414 5,113 85,082
Default probability 0.0018 0.0032 0.0055 81,020
Turnover/Assets 0.5094 1.3922 2.1536 85,678
Number of lenders per ﬁrm 3 5 8 85,678
Small and medium-sized enterprises
Bank debt/Assets 0.2979 0.4343 0.571 50,006
Equity/Assets 0.0741 0.1614 0.2841 50,006
Assets (in 1,000 e) 8,283 16,302 37,653 50,006
Turnover (in 1,000 e) 7,302 17,461 30,117 50,006
Total Indebtedness (in 1,000 e) 1,266 2,060 3,760 49,465
Default probability 0.002 0.0036 0.0062 45,491
Turnover/Assets 0.195 1.2695 2.0381 50,006
Number of lenders per ﬁrm 2 3 5 50,006
Large ﬁrms
Bank debt/Assets 0.1279 0.2124 0.3134 35,672
Equity/Assets 0.177 0.3001 0.4429 35,672
Assets (in 1,000 e) 43,594 101,525 352,725 35,672
Turnover (in 1,000 e) 75,853 130,308 275,051 35,672
Total Indebtedness (in 1,000 e) 1,524 3,278 7,669 35,617
Default probability 0.0016 0.0028 0.0046 35,529
Turnover/Assets 0.7882 1.5289 2.3205 35,672
Number of lenders per ﬁrm 5 7 13 35,672
Notes: Changing numbers of observations are due to missing values for some variables
Table 7: Summary statistics for the bank size (total assets in Million Euros)
25th percentile Median 75th percentile N
All Banks 317 677 1,550 1450
Other ﬁnancial Institutions 2,190 9,700 25,500 88
Commercial Banks 311 747 2,790 188
Landesbanks 50,900 83,800 127,000 14
Savings Banks 712 1,180 2,070 515
Cooperative Banks Head Institutions 26,200 38,300 101,000 4
Cooperative Banks 220 351 576 636
Relationship-level Data Set
All Banks 3,100 29,300 238,000 79,344
Other ﬁnancial Institutions 22,600 29,500 40,700 9,098
Commercial Banks 15,100 226,000 356,000 36,660
Landesbanks 80,700 137,000 265,000 8,950
Savings Banks 1,300 2,530 5,340 15,297
Cooperative Banks Head Institutions 34,800 111,000 154,000 2,681
Cooperative Banks 342 632 1,370 6,658
Firm-level Data Set
Average Banksize 7,182 72,463 191,040 25,073
18Table 8: Robustness checks Merger-Eﬀect, Firm-level (only SMEs)





Merge-Dummy -0.014765** 0.017887** -0.014936** -0.014691**
(-2.29) (-2.52) (-2.32) (-2.28)
Merge-Dummy (t-1) -0.005818 0.014669* -0.006352 -0.005357
(-0.86) (-1.94) (-0.93) (-0.79)
Merge-Dummy (t-2) 0.012783* 0.037780*** 0.012805* 0.013436**
(-1.88) (-4.99) (-1.89) (-1.97)
Concentration (HHI) -0.092973 -0.038839 -0.084942 -0.092772
(-1.13) (-0.42) (-1.04) (-1.13)
Default probability 2.344752*** 2.363404*** 2.345976***
(-4.22) (-4.26) (-4.22)
Equity/Assets -0.696132*** -0.688229*** -0.695303***
(-19) (-18.8) (-18.98)
Turnover/Assets -0.151456*** -0.152348*** -0.151315***
(-21.65) (-21.81) (-21.63)






Number of lenders (3-6) 0.360756***
(-38.35)
Number of lenders (7-10) 0.657997***
(-28.21)
Number of lenders (>10) 0.918573***
(-17.12)
Av. bank size (assets in bn e) -0.000053
(-1.41)
Constant 8.222893*** 6.445623*** 8.225779*** 8.226098***
(-445.06) (-78.14) (-470.33) (-441.92)
Observations 17,971 17,302 18,041 17,971
Number of ﬁrms 4,975 4,871 4,979 4,975
R-squared 0.34 0.22ă 0.34 0.34
within R-squared 0.342 0.223 0.343 0.342
between R-squared 0.539 0.308 0.544 0.538
overall R-squared 0.542 0.333 0.545 0.54
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
19Table 9: Robustness checks Size-Eﬀect, Relationship level (only SMEs)
Dependent variable: Bank debt/Firm’s assets
FE-Regression FE-Regression FE-Regression POLS
Baseline
Firm- Without ﬁrm-
Baseline variation side dummies
Bank size (assets in bn e) -0.000006** -0.000006** -0.000006** -0.000074***
(-2.15) (-2.24) (-2.21) (-14.35)
Commercial Banks 0.000554 0.0009 0.000605 -0.007398**
(-0.38) (-0.59) (-0.42) (-2.56)
Landesbanks 0.001396 0.002166 0.001397 -0.003467
(-0.8) (-1.19) (-0.8) (-0.98)
Savings Banks -0.001308 -0.000663 -0.001292 -0.022161***
(-0.86) (-0.42) (-0.85) (-7.62)
Coop. Banks Head institutions 0.000444 0.001507 0.000483 -0.011406**
(-0.18) (-0.57) (-0.19) (-2.22)
Cooperative Banks -0.001439 -0.000685 -0.001415 -0.027657***
(-0.79) (-0.36) (-0.78) (-8.15)
Concentration (HHI) -0.014735 0.005717 -0.014869 0.077500***
(-0.99) (-0.37) (-1) (-3.5)
Default probability 2.411672*** 2.419003*** 0.637549***
(-25.44) (-25.51) (-4.47)
Equity/Assets -0.320741*** -0.319475*** -0.540899***
(-48.73) (-48.65) (-91.97)






Number of lenders (3-6) 0.033452***
(-21.08)
Number of lenders (7-10) 0.060618***
(-21.79)
Number of lenders (>10) 0.092770***
(-18.66)
Constant 0.521869*** 0.674543*** 0.521792*** 0.601392***
(-109.94) (-47.82) (-173.42) (-119.52)
Observations 42,388 42,809 42,388 42,388
Number of ﬁrms 4,949 4,962 4,949
R-squared 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.27
within R-squared 0.114 0.029 0.112
between R-squared 0.211 0.119 0.186
overall R-squared 0.198 0.065 0.173
Notes: Omitted category for bank pillar aﬃliation of lender: other ﬁnancial institutions.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
20Table 10: Robustness checks Size-Eﬀect, Firm-level (only SMEs)
Dependent variable: Bank debt/Firm’s assets





Av. bank size (assets in bn e) -0.000034*** -0.000039*** -0.000037*** -0.000117***
(-3.18) (-3.3) (-3.35) (-13.97)
Concentration (HHI) 0.000134 0.005828 0.002048 -0.001526
(-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-0.04)
Default probability 2.044871*** 2.055774*** 0.975244***
(-12.47) (-12.56) (-4.81)
Equity/Assets -0.293863*** -0.295076*** -0.522659***
(-27.33) (-27.33) (-59.98)
Number of lenders per ﬁrm 0.015560*** 0.015971*** 0.002176***
(-17.57) (-18.1) (-3.08)






Number of lenders (3-6) 0.036145***
(-13.71)
Number of lenders (7-10) 0.064819***
(-9.84)
Number of lenders (>10) 0.097243***
(-6.35)
Constant 0.478126*** 0.708600*** 0.482958*** 0.539332***
(-87.64) (-29.65) (-93.22) (-84.97)
Observations 17,971 17,164 18,041 17,971
Number of ﬁrms 4,975 4,858 4,979
R-squared 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.27
within R-squared 0.119 0.031 0.122
between R-squared 0.145 0.12 0.133
overall R-squared 0.149 0.095 0.137
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
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